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THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT OF 1975- LA ESPERANZA DE
CALIFORNIA PARA EL FUTURO*
Herman M. Levy**
On June 5, 1975, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., signed
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA)' into law, which
became effective August 28, 1975. Enactment of the ALRA set
the stage for California's legislative attempt to resolve the numer-
ous farm labor problems, often resulting in bitter and violent dis-
putes, which have haunted the state for many years. The new
legislation is the first state law which purports to deal with agri-
cultural problems in a comprehensive and even-handed manner.2
When the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 was
passed in 1935, agriculture was specifically excluded. 4  This ex-
* California's Hope for the Future.
** B.A. 1951, University of Pittsburgh; LL.B. 1954, Harvard University;
Diploma in Law 1968, Oxford University; Prof. of Law, University of Santa
Clara. Prof. Levy served as a labor law consultant to the Agriculture and Services
Agency in the drafting of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act.
1. Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LABOR CODE § 1140 et
seq. (Deering 1975 Adv. Leg. Serv. No. 2) [hereinafter cited as ALRAI. The
ALRA unfair labor practices and election sections are printed as an appendix
infra.
2. See, e.g., Agricultural Employment Relations Act, Aiuz. REv. STATS. 09
23-1381 to 23-1395 (1972); Idaho Agricultural Labor Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 22-
4101 to 22-4113 (1972); KANS. STATS. ANN. §§ 44-818 to 44-830 (1972), as
amended (1974); Picketing of Agricultural Production Sites Act, ORE. REV. STATS.
§ 662.805 to 662.825 (1963). None of these statutes provides the kind of bal-
anced, comprehensive regulatory scheme contemplated by the California legisla-
tion. See notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text infra.
3. National Labor Relations Act (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151-68
(1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRAJ. In 1947 the NLRA was amended and be-
came section 101 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §H 141-97
(1970). Subsection 17 of section 101 (29 U.S.C. § 167 (1970)) authorizes con-
tinued use of the title "National Labor Relations Act" for the amended act as
it appears in the Labor Management Relations Act.
4. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) (emphasis added) provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual Whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
services of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an inde-
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clusion was not based on the fact that agriculture was so unique
an industry that the NLRA could not successfully regulate it.
Rather, it reflected a political reality: the labor-oriented members
of Congress needed the votes of legislators from agricultural dis-
tricts to pass the NLRA, and the price exacted for these votes was
the exclusion of agriculture from coverage by the NLRA.5
Concern about agricultural labor relations developed on both
federal and state levels in the late sixties and early seventies.
Some states passed piecemeal legislation,6 while others, attempt-
ing a more comprehensive scheme, weighted the legislation in
favor of grower interests.7 Federal proposals were generally of
two kinds: legislation to eliminate the agricultural exclusion and
apply the NLRA to agriculture in the same way it applies to in-
dustries involved in interstate commerce;8 or new legislation
specifically directed to agriculture.9 None of the proposed federal
legislation has passed.
California had made prior legislative efforts to regulate agri-
cultural labor relations. Bills were introduced in the legislature
in the sixties and seventies, and an initiative, Proposition 22, was
on the ballot in 1972.10 None of the proposals, however, resulted
in any new law. Some proposals favored special interests, while
others failed to provide the type and scope of coverage needed.
Of the six legislative proposals submitted for consideration
in early 1975, five were almost exact copies of the National Labor
Relations Act, with certain omissions or additions." The one ex-
ception was the bill offered by the United Farm Workers, which
would have created a commission somewhat different from the
agencies proposed by the other bills; it contained some provisions
similar to the NLRA, and included others which varied from
pendent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act
[45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1970], as amended from time to time, or
by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
5. Morris, Agricultural Labor and National Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1939, 1951-56 (1966).
6. See, e.g., KANS. STATS. ANN. §§ 44-818 to 44-830 (1972), as amended
(1974); ORE. REv. STATS. §§ 662.805 to 662.825 (1963).
7. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STATS. §§ 23-1381 to 23-1395 (1971). See also
Rose, State Regulation of Agricultural Relations-The Arizona Farm Labor Law
-A Constitutional Analysis, 1973 LAW AND SOC. ORDER 373 (1973); Cohen &
Rose, State Regulation of Agricultural Labor Relations-The Arizona Farm Labor
Law-An Interpretive and Comparative Analysis, 1973 LAW AN > SoC. ORDER 313
(1973).
8. S. 285, H.R. 4179, 4408, 4789, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
9. H.R. 3256, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
10. See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 1723, 1724, 1887, A.B. 3370, 3816 (1974); S.B. 493,
A.B. 2304 (1973); A.B. 9, 1214 (1972); A.B. 964 (1971); S.B. 307, 915, A.B.
1333, 1680 (1969); A.B. 776 (1968); A.B. 747, 749, 750, 751, 1163 (1967).
11. See Cal. S.B. 205, 239, 308, A.B. 159, 393 (1975).
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NLRA provisions or were not encompassed by the NLRA.12 None
of these bills passed.
New bills which were introduced in April, 1975, and became
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 197511 were modeled on
the NLRA, with some substantial changes to accommodate the
special needs of the agricultural industry or to correct provisions
which clearly would be deficient or inappropriate if applied to
agriculture. The choice of the NLRA model appeared to be a
reasonable one under the circumstances: the NLRA has been in
existence approximately 40 years, regulating labor-management
relations in the private industrial sector. Although periodically
subject to attack by both management and labor, the Act has
proved, on the whole, to be fair to the competing interests. Other
new or inventive approaches might have served the same purpose
in agriculture, but there appeared to be no good reason ,to experi-
ment with other models when there was an existing system which
had stood the test of time.
The overriding principle guiding the drafting of this new
legislation was fairness to all parties affected-growers, unions,
farm workers, and the public. At -the same time, the law had to
provide a viable framework to regulate agricultural employers and
unions, protect the workers, and deal effectively with the problems
arising in this area.
This article will examine the more significant provisions of
the ALRA and, where appropriate, compare and contrast them
with the NLRA. In instances involving the less significant pro-
visions, it will be noted without extended discussion that the
ALRA provisions duplicate the NLRA.
The new law has great promise, but only the passage of time
and the development of the legal framework will prove whether
the ALRA can solve the problems of agriculture and serve the
best interests of the public.
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS
The Agricultural Labor Relations Act borrows freely from
the NLRA for such basic definitions as "labor organization,"
' 14
"person,"' 5 "representative," '1 6 "labor dispute,"'17 and "super-
12. See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 1 §§ 1143, 1144, 1148 (1975).
13. Cal. S.B. 813, A.B. 1533 (1975); S.B. 1, A.B. 1 (3d Extraordinary Sess.
1975-76).
14. ALRA § 1140.4(f); seeNLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
15. ALRA § 1140.4(d); see NLRA § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1970).
16. ALRA § 1140.4(e); see__NLRA § 2(4), 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1970).
17. ALRA § 1140.4(h); see NLRA § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1970).
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visor."'" With its definitions of "agriculture," "agricultural
employee" and "agricultural employer," the law provides as broad
a coverage of agriculture as possible, while at the same time limit-
ing its jurisdiction to those who are clearly agricultural em-
ployees. 19
The NLRA excludes from coverage anyone who fits the Fair
Labor Standards Act definition of an agricultural employee." °
The ALRA, by adopting the same definition, extends its coverage
to all persons excluded from the NLRA. This approach would
appear to be perfectly balanced: what the NLRA excluded, the
ALRA included, both relying on the Fair Labor Standard defini-
tion. However, prior to passage of 'the final draft of the law, the
building and construction trade unions expressed concern that the
ALRA definition appeared to encompass construction people
working on farm land and to make them subject to the provisions
of the ALRA. 21
In order to meet this concern, and probably because the new
Agricultural Labor Relations Board would have minimal interest
in these construction workers, language was added to the ALRA
definition of agricultural employee to exclude
any employee who performs work to be done at the site of
the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work . . . or logging timber or timber
clearing work in initial preparation of land for farming or who
does land leveling or only land surveying for any of the
above. 2
2
It may be that the exclusionary language of the ALRA has
created a no-man's-land with respect to these workers. The
NLRA may see them as falling within 'the Fair Labor Standards
Act definition of agricultural workers when performing work on
a farm, and thus exempt from NLRA coverage; but the ALRA
specifically excludes them. If this is so, these workers, subject
to neither Act, would be unregulated except to the extent -that
other state laws govern their activities.23
18. ALRA § 1140.4(j); see NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
19. See ALRA §H 1140.4(a), 1140.4(b), 1140.4(c).
20. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §H 203(f), 213
(1970).
21. For examples of the criteria the courts use to determine what occupations
fall within the "agricultural employee" category, see, e.g., NLRB v. Olaa Sugar
Co., 242 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1957); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951); NLRB v. John W. Campbell,
Inc., 159 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1947).
22. ALRA § 1140.4(b).
23. The NLRB has had some recent court disputes concerning the exact scope
of the agricultural laborer exemption. See Abbott Farms v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904(5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Ryckebosch, 471 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY
The newly created Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(ALRB) duplicates the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
in form and responsibilities. Five members appointed for five
year terms by the Governor are given the primary responsi-
bility for administering the new law with respect to elections and
unfair labor practices.24 As in the federal law, the judicial and
prosecutorial functions of the agency are kept separate: the
General Counsel is appointed by the Governor, rather than by the
board.25 Permitting the board to select the General Counsel
might have given rise to an objection that judicial and prosecutorial
functions were merged under the board's direct control.
The law establishes the principal ALRB office in Sacramento
and provides for regional offices as -the Board deems necessary.26
Regional offices have already been opened in Fresno, Salinas,
Riverside and Sacramento.
Although some of the other farm labor bills introduced in the
legislature27 would have required the Governor to appoint two of
the five board members from agriculture, two from labor and one
from the public, the ALRA omits such limitations on the Gov-
ernor's appointive power. It was felt that such a requirement
might result in a board split along partisan lines, with the public
member being the decisive vote. Without these limitations, the
Governor can choose any rational and intelligent person who will
administer the law competently, without being required to con-
sider past or present affiliations.
There is another provision not specifically included in the
NLRA or the ALRA but which has nevertheless become an un-
written policy controlling appointments to the NLRB. The policy
is that the President shall appoint no more than three of the five
board members from his own political party.2 8  The purpose of
the policy is to insulate the board from extreme political partisan-
ship. Whether the present or future governors will adopt this
unwritten rule of the NLRA in appointing ALRB members
remains to be determined.29
v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Gass,
377 F.2d 438 (1st Cir. 1967).
24. ALRA §§ 1141-1151.6; see NLRA §§ 3-6, 11, 12, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156,
161, 162 (1970). Terms of ALRB members are staggered at one-year intervals.
ALRA § 1141(b).
25. ALRA § 1149. The General Counsel is appointed for a four-year term.
26. ALRA § 1142.
27. See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 205, 239, A.B. 159, 393 (1975); A.B. 1 (3d Extraordi-
nary Sess. 1975-76).
28. Cal. S.B. 205, 239, A.B. 159, 393 (1975) contained provisions which lim-
ited appointments to no more than three from the same political party.
29. Appointment of the initial Agricultural Labor Relations Board, without
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Among the organizational provisions of the Act is section
1148, which declares that "the board shall follow applicable prece-
dents of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."" ° The
language of the statute appears to require the ALRB to adhere
to the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, courts of appeals
and the NLRB interpreting the NLRA. The extent to which the
ARLB will feel bound to follow these NLRA precedents in
similar factual situations will have to be decided by the Farm
Board in the forthcoming years. Regardless of the board's
decisions, there may well be litigation by those who feel that the
board has not met the statute's requirements.
Many NLRA precedents are based on a single case or a
series of cases, and it is interesting to speculate how the ALRB
will view these precedents when applied to the farm labor scene.
For example, a major requirement of the new legislation is that
all bargaining representatives must have been elected by secret
ballot and must have been certified as the winners in those elec-
tions before they can negotiate collective bargaining agreements
with employers. Under the NLRA, however, a union may secure
the right to bargain with the employer even though it has never
won a secret-ballot election, if the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices have made the holding of a fair election improbable. In
these circumstances, the NLRB would adhere to the decision in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co."1 and order the employer to bar-
gain with the union even though there had been no election.
Query whether the ALRB, faced with a similar situation, would
consider this NLRB decision an "applicable precedent" in view
of the fact that the ALRA is committed to awarding bargaining
status only through the election process. The Act even makes
it an unfair labor practice for a farmer to bargain with a labor
organization which has not been. certified as the bargaining rep-
resentative after an election. 2
Overall, however, section 1148 should produce more benefits
than problems for the board, because it can lighten the board's
decisional burden by providing invaluable guidelines and estab-
lished rationales for many of the initial decisions that will have
to be made. This will allow the board more time to concentrate
on the policies and decisions unique to the area of agriculture.
The ALRA follows the language of the NLRA in specifying
the general investigatory powers necessary for the proper function-
further comment, would not necessarily offer a clear indication of the adoption
or rejection of the unwritten policy.
30. ALRA § 1148.
31. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
32. ALRA § 1153(f).
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ing of the agency."
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Employer Unfair Labor Practices
The ALRA, like its model, proscribes certain unfair labor
practices by employers and labor organizations. The employer
unfair labor practices remain basically unchanged from the NLRA.
Thus, agricultural employers are prohibited from interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by the Act;34 from dominating or supporting labor organiza-
tions; 5 from discriminating against employees in hiring or tenure
of employment;"6 from discharging or discriminating against em-
ployees because they have filed charges or given testimony; 7 and
from refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with certified
labor organizations."8
One new provision contained in the ALRA makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to recognize, bargain with, or sign
a collective bargaining agreement with any labor organization not
certified pursuant to the Act.3" This section ties in with the elec-
tion procedure of the Act, which specifies that the sole means by
which a labor organization can achieve certification as bargaining
representative is to win a secret ballot election conducted by the
board.4" These sections thus prohibit voluntary recognition of a
labor organization by an employer based on authorization cards
signed by the employees and presented by the labor organization,
a practice permitted by decisions interpreting the NLRA.41 The
33. ALRA § 1151-1151.6; see NLRA § 11, 12, 29 U.S.C. § 161, 162
(1970).
34. ALRA § 1153(a); see NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
Section 1152 sets out the guaranteed rights of agricultural employees which are
the same as section 7 of the NLRA:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or as-
sist labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of continued employment as authorized in subdivision (c) of Section
1153.
35. ALRA § 1153(b); see NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
36. ALRA § 1153(c); see NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
37. ALRA § 1153(d); see NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970).
38. ALRA § 1153(e); see NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
The ALRA adds the words "good faith" to the statute in defining the employer
unfair labor practice while the NLRA incorporates the concept of good faith both
in its decisions and its definition of "to bargain collectively," but the words were
not included in section 8(a) (5).
39. ALRA § 1153(f).
40. See ALRA § 1156.3.
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transport, Inc., of South Dakota, 453 F.2d 193 (8th
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
ALRA's certification procedure reflects the feeling that the best
method for determining the employees' choice of a bargaining
representative is via the secret ballot election.
Under the NLRA, there may not be a new election for 12
months following a certification, and for that period there is an
irrebuttable presumption, absent unusual circumstances, that the
labor organization has remained the majority representative.42  If
the employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to bar-
gain during the certification year, the NLRB can order the em-
ployer to bargain even though the certification year has elapsed
and the union may not have the same majority it had when it was
certified. 43 To do otherwise would allow the employer to benefit
from his violation of the NLRA; it might encourage him to drag
out bargaining beyond the certification year and then claim he had
no obligation to bargain because there had been a turnover of em-
ployees and the union no longer represented a majority of the
employees.
The ALRA has a provision intended to achieve a similar
result when an employer has not bargained in good faith with the
labor organization during the certification year." This ALRA
section permits the board to extend the certification for up to one
additional year when it finds that the employer has not bargained
in good faith during the certification year. It may be, however,
that this section is superfluous and that the ALRB, even without
the provision, could have achieved the desired intention by follow-
ing applicable NLRA precedent in this area, as required by
section 1148. 45
The ARLA permits the agricultural employer and the labor
organization to negotiate a "union security agreement," whereby
the farm worker is required, as a condition of employment, to be-
come a member of the labor organization on or after the fifth day
of employment (or the effective date of the agreement, whichever
is later).46 Similar agreements are allowed under the NRLA,
with the employee required to join the union on or after the 30th
day of employment. 4  The transient, often short-term nature of
agricultural employment necessitated the shorter five day period.
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Tom's Supermarket, Inc., 385 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1967);
Filler Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1967).
42. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970); see, e.g., Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 785 (1962); Gen-
eral Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 413 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1969).
44. ALRA § 1155.2(b).
45. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
46. ALRA § 1153(c).
47. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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The Act affords protection to the migrant worker who may be em-
ployed on a number of farms during a month's time, and thus sub-
ject to security agreements negotiated by different unions, by
eliminating any obligation that an employee pay dues to more than
one union during a calendar month.
The ALRA contains another feature related to the union
security agreement which is not found in the NLRA. The new
law defines union membership as satisfaction of all reasonable
terms and conditions applicable to every member in good
standing, and provides that union membership shall not be termi-
nated except in compliance with a constitution and bylaws which
afford democratic procedures to members and applicants for mem-
bership. 8 This provision appears to have been designed to en-
courage internal union democracy and to require that a labor or-
ganization negotiating union security agreements adhere to certain
basic democratic principles.
A question may arise as to the exact scope of protection pro-
vided the employee by the ALRA. Under the NLRA, a union
member subject to a valid union security agreement may be dis-
charged at union request only for failure to tender periodic dues
and initiation fees.4" It is often said that this NLRA provision
is designed to insulate a worker's job from his union activities.
Only when an employee has failed to tender dues or initiation fees
can the union demand his discharge; it cannot get his job merely
because he has not paid a lawfully levied union assessment or
failed to conform to general requirements of being a good union
member. 0
The ALRA, on the other hand, permits the union to seek a
discharge pursuant to a union security agreement for "failure to
satisfy membership requirements," which thus provides more
grounds for discharge than the NLRA. The exact parameters of
these "membership requirements" will have to be decided by the
ALRB. It appears, however, that while this section of the ALRA
permits the union a broader power to discharge pursuant to a law-
ful union security agreement, it seeks to balance the power by re-
quiring adherence to "democratic procedures" and providing for
more internal union regulation than does the NLRA.
48. ALRA § 1153(c).
49. NLRA §§ 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(2), 158(a)(3)
(1970); see, e.g., NLRB v. Broderick Wood Products Co., 261 F.2d 548 (10th
Cir. 1958); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 203 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1953).
50. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB
v. Spector Freight System, 273 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1960); cf. NLRB v. Die &
Tool Makers Lodge 113, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); Mayer, Union Security and the Taft-Hartley Act, 1961 DUKE L.J. 505.
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Union Unfair Labor Practices
The ALRA parallels the NLRB in the definitions of many
union unfair labor practices. Like the NLRA, the state law pro-
hibits restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of their
guaranteed rights and in their selection of representatives for pur-
poses of collective bargaining;1 specific discrimination against em-
ployees;52 and refusal to bargain collectively in good faith.5" The
new law includes the NLRA provisions prohibiting excess dues
payments,54 featherbedding," and certain types of payments by
employers to labor organizations or employees. 6 It also specifies
the procedures to be followed when one of the parties seeks to
terminate or modify the collective bargaining agreement. 7
Two areas of labor law where the ALRA has deviated from
its NLRA model are the secondary boycott58 and the "hot cargo
clause."59  The classic secondary boycott situation exists when a
union having a labor dispute with a primary employer attempts
to pressure secondary or neutral employers or employees with an
object of having the neutral employers stop doing business with
the primary employer."0  The theory is to place maximum
pressure on the primary employer and thus force him to concede
to union demands in the labor dispute. Secondary boycotts were
lawful under the NLRA until the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments.
The prohibitions were enacted because Congress felt that true
neutrals were suffering economic injuries in labor disputes that
were not their own, and that it was in the public interest to afford
these neutrals protection.6'
There was much controversy preceding the adoption of the
ALRA's secondary boycott provision. Some bills in the legislature
proposed that the NLRA's secondary boycott provisions be
adopted in toto;62 others sought to exclude any restrictions on the
boycott.63 The argument presented for permitting secondary boy-
51. ALRA § 1154(a)(1)-(2); see NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1970).
52. ALRA § 1154(b); see NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
53. ALRA § 1154(c); see NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
54. ALRA § 1154(e); see NLRA § 8(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (5) (1970).
55. ALRA § 1154(f); see NLRA § 8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1970).
56. ALRA § 1155.4; see NLRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
57. ALRA § 1153.3; see NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
58. ALRA § 1154(d); see NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1970).
59. ALRA § 1154.5; see NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964); NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
61. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
692 (1951).
62. Cal. S.B. 308, A.B. 159 (1975).
63. Cal. A.B. 1 (1975).
[Vol. 15
1975] AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 793
cotts was that unions trying to organize agriculture should be given
the same advantages under the ALRA that other unions had for
12 years under the NLRA before the banning of the secondary
boycott in 1947. The legislation as enacted bans the classic
secondary boycott with the original language of the NLRA.64 But,
like the NLRA, the ALRA does permit a labor organization to
exercise its first amendment rights by truthfully advising the public
that products produced by an agricultural employer with whom it
has a dispute are being distributed by ,a neutral employer.6 5 This
type of informational publicity, which includes picketing, is sanc-
tioned as long as it does not have the effect of inducing others
not to make deliveries or perform services at the neutral's estab-
lishment (the NLRA has the same limitation), and provided that
it does not have the effect of requesting the public to cease patron-
izing the neutral (NLRA statutory language does not include this
limitation) .6
The ALRA goes further with respect to publicity including
picketing which has the effect of requesting the public to cease
patronizing a neutral employer by permitting such publicity only
if the labor organization is currently certified as representative of
the primary employer's employees.6" The ALRA further states
that publicity other than picketing, but including peaceful distribu-
tion of literature which has the effect of requesting the public to
cease patronizing the neutral employer, is permitted only if the
labor organization has not lost an election for the primary em-
ployer's employees within the preceding 12 months and no other
labor organization is currently certified as representative of those
employees.68
Although the new legislation did not go as far as unions
would have desired in permitting the use of the secondary boycott
to bring pressure on -the primary employer, it does go beyond what
is permitted by the NLRA: it provides agricultural unions with
an additional bargaining tool by allowing the unions, under the
conditions specified in the Act, to bring indirect pressure on a
primary employer by requesting that the public not patronize the
neutral who is doing business with the primary. The agricultural
unions, pursuant to the Act's specific limitations, could not only
tell the public that a particular supermarket is selling lettuce pro-
64. This provision also includes all the other prohibitions of NLRA § 8(b) (4)
(e.g., the jurisdictional disputes section).
65. ALRA § 1154(d)(2); see NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(B) (1970); cf. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 670, 377 U.S. 58
(1964).
66. ALRA § 1154(d).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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duced by a farmer with whom it has a primary labor dispute and
request the public not to buy that product, but the union could
also ask the public not to patronize that particular supermarket
at all. According to decisions under the NLRA, a union whose
publicity is directed to inducing the public not to patronize the
neutral business establishment would be in violation of the law.69
California's labor organizations were particularly sensitive to
the introduction of any ALRA limitations on the secondary boy-
cott, since it is not prohibited by state law. Accordingly, the sec-
tion which follows the ALRA secondary boycott provisions makes
clear that a labor organization's intrastate activities involving non-
agricultural employees will continue to be governed by section 923
of the Labor Code70 and applicable judicial prededents, and thus
not subject to the ALRA secondary boycott limitations. 71
The ALRA modifies the "hot cargo" ban of ithe NLRA.
Under the NLRA, a labor organization and an employer are pro-
hibited from entering into an agreement under which the em-
ployer would cease using, handling, selling, transporting, or deal-
ing in the products of any other employer, or cease doing business
with any other person. The ALRA incorporates ithe same ban; 72
however, it does permit what might otherwise be considered a "hot
cargo" agreement in a limited circumstance. 7  The statute pro-
vides that the hot cargo prohibition does not apply to an agree-
ment between an employer and a labor organization representing
his employees if that union is also the certified representative of
the employees of a supplier of ingredients that are integrated into
a product distributed or produced by the first employer, and if
no collective bargaining agreement exists between the supplier
and the union.
The law thus provides the union with an additional bargain-
ing tool to pressure an employer who may be refusing to bargain
with his employees' certified representative. For example, a
union which represents the employees of a winery might lawfully
include in its contract with the winery a clause prohibiting the pur-
chase of grapes from any farmer whose employees the union has
been certified to represent but who has not executed a collective
bargaining agreement with the union. This same section also ex-
cludes from the hot cargo prohibition any agreement between a
labor organization and an agricultural employer which relates to
contracting or subcontracting work to be done on the farm.
69. Cf. Local 37, Honolulu Typographical Union v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
70. CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971).
71. ALRA § 1154(d).
72. NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
73. ALRA § 1154.5.
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One major NLRA provision which has been deleted from the
ALRA concerns recognitional picketing."4 The NLRA prohibits
picketing the object of which is to force employer recognition of
the union or to force employees to select the union as their bar-
gaining representative, when the employer has lawfully recog-
nized another labor organization 75 or when there has been a valid
election during the preceding 12 months.76  Absent any of these
circumstances, the NLRA allows the union to engage in picketing
for a period not to exceed 30 days.77 However, if the union does
picket, it must file a petition for an election within a reasonable
time (not to exceed 30 days), and the representation question will
be resolved by this election.
One of the California legislative proposals sought to permit
recognitional picketing for organizational purposes, and would
have allowed the union to qualify as bargaining representative
without an election, based on a showing that a majority of employ-
ees had participated in the picketing. 78 Others felt that permitting
recognitional picketing for the purpose of establishing a bargaining
relationship would seriously undermine the secret ballot election
procedure, which was considered the most desirable means of
selecting the bargaining representative. The ALRA therefore
prohibits even the limited type of recognitional picketing per-
mitted under the NLRA. 79
A provision contained in the ALRA but not in the NLRA
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer or labor organ-
ization to arrange for persons to become employees for the
primary purpose of voting in elections.8 ' This section is designed
to deal with a type of ballot box stuffing made possible by the
transient, short-term nature of agricultural work. There was con-
cern that parties might attempt to affect the results of an election
by arranging for employees who could be relied upon to vote in
a certain way to be hired before a scheduled election. The anti-
tampering provision was intended to protect the integrity of the
electoral process and to ensure that election results accurately
reflect the wishes of the employees. This problem apparently
does not arise under the NLRA, which covers a great number of
74. NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970).
75. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1970).
76. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1970).
77. NLRA § 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1970).
78. Cal. A.B. 1 (1975).
79. ALRA § 1154(g). However, this section follows the NLRA's specific
limitations and permits picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ
members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization.
80. ALRA § 1154.6.
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established industries with less transient work forces. In any
event, if there was evidence of an attempt to influence an NLRB-
supervised election in this manner, the NLRB would find a viola-
tion of the Act and set aside the election."1
THE ELECTIONS
Many of the major differences between the ALRA and the
NLRA model occur in the provisions relating to the board's
responsibility to conduct elections.82  These deviations were
necessitated by the differences between agriculture and the indus-
tries regulated by the NLRA. An electoral system for agricultural
workers must provide a speedy, secret ballot election for all
eligible voters. The election must be conducted when the em-
ployment payroll reflects a meaningful complement of workers,
and the employees must be afforded the opportunity to decide
freely whether they desire representation or not. The ALRA
election procedures, in conjunction with certain unfair labor prac-
tice sections, are designed to accomplish this end.
When a representation petition requesting an election has
been filed with the NLRB, the board may be required to hold
hearings to determine the appropriate unit of employees for the
election, and to determine which individual employees are eligible
to vote. 8 These determinations are made before the board
orders the election, and if the hearings are contested, a couple
of months can elapse from the filing of a petition until the date
of election.
The ALRA seeks to avoid the delays inherent in the NLRA
procedure by specifying the appropriate units4 and substituting a
post-election hearing for the NLRA pre-election hearing." With
respect to the appropriate unit, the ALRA provides that it must
consist of all agricultural employees of an employer, 8 in contrast
to the NLRA which allows the NLRB broad discretion as the size
and nature of the unit for the election. The ALRB has some
limited discretion to choose the unit when there are two or more
non-contiguous geographical areas involved. 8T One persuasive
81. The NLRB attempts to provide "laboratory conditions" for elections.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). Where activities of the parties
have interfered with those conditions, the board will set aside the election. See,
e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
82. ALRA § 1156-1159.
83. NLRA § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(C)(1)(A) (1970).
84. ALRA § 1156.2.
85. ALRA § 1156.3.
86. ALRA § 1156.2.
87. A statement of intent published in the Senate Journal notes with respect
to non-contiguous geographical areas and the specific problem of processing, paok-
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reason for including all employees in the unit, rather -than permit-
ting the board to choose from a variety of units, was that this
approach would allow one union to represent both the field work-
ers and the more highly skilled farm employees. It was felt that
this type of representation might facilitate the advancement of the
less skilled employees to the higher paid skilled positions, while
representation of the skilled and unskilled employees by different
unions might well hamper this desirable objective. However, it
would appear that a little more discretion in the choice of appro-
priate units could have been vested in the ALRB without seriously
affecting -that objective. 8s
The ALRB post-election hearing"9 is part of the law's design
to allow a speedy election at the time most eligible voters are avail-
able. Since the law requires that the election be conducted within
seven days from the filing of the petition requesting an election,"°
any formal hearing would have to be held after ballots were cast.
The fact that the appropriate unit is specified eliminates any
necessity for an involved pre-election hearing on that issue, and
it was felt that any other questions bearing on the election could
be adequately dealt with after the election.
The election procedure is initiated when a labor organization
or the employees file a petition signed by91 (or accompanied by
cards signed by) a majority of the employees currently in the bar-
gaining unit.9 2 The petition must allege the following: 93
1. That the number of agricultural employees currently em-
ployed by the employer named in the petition, as determined
ing and cooling operations not located on farm sites:
It is the intent of SB 1 (Third Extraordinary Session) and AB 1(Third Extraordinary Session) that the board, in exercising its discretion
to determine bargaining units in non-contiguous geographical areas, may
consider processing, packing, and cooling operations which are not con-
ducted on a farm as constituting employment in a separate or non-con-
tiguous geographic area for the purpose of Section 1156.2.
CAL. ST. S. JOUR. 16 (daily ed. May 29, 1975).
88. The adamant urging of the United Farm Workers that the unit include
all employees may stem from that organization's past experiences with various
governmental institutions which exercise broad discretion.
89. ALRA § 1156.3(c).
90. ALRA § 1156.3(a). This section also provides:
If at the time the election petition is filed a majority of the employees
in a bargaining unit are engaged in a strike the board shall, with all due
diligence, attempt to hold a secret ballot election within 48 hours of the
filing of such petition.
91. ALRA § 1156.3(a).
92. The NLRB requires authorization cards from 30% of employees in the
bargaining unit. The ALRA's 50% requirement reflects the fact that there will
be less time for organizational activity following the filing of the petition.
Any other labor organization can qualify to appear on the ballot by present-
ing authorization cards signed by 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit
at least 24 hours prior to the election. ALRA § 1156.3(b).
93. ALRA § 1156.3(a)(l)-(4).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
from his payroll immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion, is not less than 50 percent of the peak agricultural em-
ployment for the current calendar year.94
2. That no valid election has been conducted among agricul-
tural employees of the employer named in the petition within
the 12 months immediately preceding the filing.
3. That no labor organization is currently certified as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the agricul-
tural employees of the employer named in the petition.
4. That the petition is not barred by an existing collective-
bargaining agreement.
Within five days after the election, a petition may be filed
with the board asserting that the allegations in the petition were
incorrect or that the board improperly determined the geographi-
cal scope of the unit. The petition may also object to the con-
duct of the election or to conduct affecting the results of the elec-
tion. These questions can be resolved at the post-election hearing;
but meanwhile, the expedited election procedure has enabled the
board to obtain election ballots which reflect the employees' choice
in a timely election, before they scatter to other farms as part of
their seasonal and migratory employment.
The board will certify the results of the election if the alle-
gations in the post-election petition do not provide sufficient
grounds to invalidate the election. If the board finds that the alle-
gations in the petition are correct-that the election was not prop-
erly conducted or that misconduct affected the results-the per-
missive language of the statute states that it may refuse to cer-
tify."9 This language would appear to allow certification where
the union has won the election and the allegation or objections,
although correct, constitute a technical point of minor significance
in view of the union's victory.
The ALRA also contains provisions allowing the decertifica-
tion of bargaining representatives.9" A petition for decertification
requires the signatures of 30 percent of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. It must be filed when the number of agricultural
employees is not less than 50 percent of the employer's peak agri-
cultural employment for the current calendar year, and it may be
filed only during the statutory open period when the union's col-
94. ALRA § 1156.4 provides in part:
[P]eak agricultural employment for the prior season shall alone not be
the basis for determining employment but rather the board shall estimate
peak employment on the basis of acreage and crop statistics which shall
be applied uniformly throughout the State of California and upon all
other relevant data.
95. ALRA § 1156.3(c).
96. ALRA § 1156.7(c).
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lective bargaining agreement does not function as a contract bar.
97
These provisions, like their NLRA counterparts, assure that em-
ployees will be able to change representatives or decide upon no
representation if they so desire.
An ALRA provision which has no counterpart in the NLRA
allows the ALRB to decertify a labor organization that engages
in employment discrimination. 8 The statute provides that the
ALRB shall decertify a labor organization if the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) finds99 that it has violated
the federal equal employment statute'10 by engaging in discrimi-
nation based on race, color, national origin, sex or any other invid-
ious classification. The reason for this section is obvious: state
law should not afford bargaining status to a labor organization
which flouts the national policy against discrimination. Further-
more, the ALRB makes this decision based on an EEOC deter-
mination and thus can avoid the pitfalls the NLRB has encoun-
tered in its attempts to comply with the court of appeals decision
in Mansion House v. NLRB.
101
The Mansion House decision held that proof of discrimina-
tion by a labor union in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act 0 2 was a valid defense to an NLRB finding that an em-
ployer had refused to bargain with the union. In its attempts to
adhere to the court's ruling, the NLRB has had to resolve some
questions on discrimination similar to those decided by the EEOC.
Some of these NLRB proceedings have not followed EEOC guide-
lines or evidentiary requirements, and the decisions may be incon-
sistent with those reached by the EEOC. 0 s The ALRA decertifi-
cation procedure for discrimination appears to be more practical,
because the ALRB is permitted to rely on the expertise of EEOC
and need not itself become a forum to decide questions of dis-
crimination; this enables the board to concentrate its full efforts
on problems directly related to farm labor.
By administrative decision, the NLRB has created a contract
bar doctrine: a valid collective bargaining agreement will bar a
97. Id. See notes 104-05 and accompanying text infra.
98. ALRA § 1156.3(e).
99. The statute does not specify exactly whether the EEOC finding to which
the ALRB would refer relates to an EEOC finding of probable cause or some
other decision involving the EEOC case. It would seem more likely, however,
for due process reasons that the finding would have to relate to some final deci-
sion subsequent to the EEOC's finding of probable cause.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. III 1973).
101. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. III 1973).
103. See Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1974); Williams Enter-
prises, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1974); Bekins Moving & Siorage Co., 211
N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1974).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
representation election for the term of the agreement, but not long-
er than three years.'0 4 The purpose of this rule is to encourage
the business stability that comes with a long term collective bar-
gaining agreement and to prevent challenges to the bargaining
representative and the disruption of business that would be caused
by elections during the term of the agreement. The NLRB rules
also provide that petitions for an election may be filed within a
specified period prior to the termination of the agreement, so that
the employees have the opportunity to substitute a new represen-
tative or decide to be unrepresented. Thus, the contract bar
doctrine preserves stability without locking employees into a single
union.
1 0 5
This NLRB doctrine is codified in ALRA section 1156.7(b),
which provides that a valid agreement bars an election for the term
of the agreement, but not longer than three years. This section
specifies that, to operate as a bar, the agreement must be in writing
and executed by the parties; and it must include the substantive
terms and conditions of employment. The statute incorporates an
anti-lock-in device by providing for an election if a majority of the
employees file a petition and sign authorization cards. This peti-
tion must be filed within the 12-month period before the expiration
of the existing agreement. In addition the petition must be filed
at a time when the number of employees is not less than 50 per-
cent of a farmer's peak agricultural employment for the current
calendar year, and it can be filed only if there was no valid elec-
tion among these employees in the 12 months preceding the
petition.""6
Two sections of the ALRA relate to collective bargaining
agreements executed prior to the effective date of the statute.
104. See, e.g., Carpenter's Local 1545 v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 130-31 (2d
Cir. 1960); General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
105. See, e.g., Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962); De-
luxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
106. ALRA § 1156.7(c) provides for a one-year open period, in contrast to
the 30-day period permitted by the NLRB. See cases cited in notes 104-05 supra.
It was felt that, given the seasonal nature of agricultural employment, the one-year period was necessary to insure that a union could file at peak season, when
the required complement of employees would be present. In addition, it prevents
an incumbent union from blocking any challenge by arranging for its contract to
terminate on a date when the required 50 percent of the peak work force would
not be present, thus preventing a rival union or dissatisfied employees from filing
an election petition.
If a petition is properly filed, the election will be held within seven days,
in accord with the provisions of ALRA § 1156.3(a). If the incumbent unionloses, the status of the old contract after the election is a matter that will have tobe settled by future decisions of the ALRB. Applicable NLRB precedent would
permit the new bargaining representative to void the existing contract and
renegotiate a new agreement immediately. American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
250 (1953).
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One states that such agreements shall not bar a petition for an
election. 10 7  The other, the statement of legislative intent -that
appears at the beginning of the statute, resolves any question as
to whether contracts pre-dating the ALRA became void on the
effective date of the statute.'08 If the agreements were void, em-
ployees might immediately be deprived of medical care and other
benefits afforded by the contractual agreement. The statement
of intent declares that these agreements are not void on the Act's
effective date, but are rendered void by a subsequent election and
certification.
When these provisions are read with other parts of -the
ALRA, it seems that labor organizations with pre-existing con-
tracts must undergo the electoral process and allow the employees
to choose their bargaining representative; the statement of intent
apparently provides a grace period for the contract only until an
election can be held under the ALRA. Thus, an incumbent union
with a pre-existing contract may have to undergo an election prior
to the expiration of its contract in order to establish its status as
a certified bargaining representative. 1 9  This interpretation is
consistent with other provisions of the ALRA, which establish that
it is an unfair labor practice for a union to act as a representative
without certification; that certification can only follow an election;
and that a pre-existing contract will not bar an election."10
The sections rendering pre-existing agreements voidable
might be subject to attack on the theory that they constitute an
impairment of contract However, the state's police power gives
it broad authority to regulate businesses within the state; when the
ALRA provisions are measured against this authority, the new law
will probably withstand judicial scrutiny."
The ALRA spells out in somewhat more detail than the
NLRA the eligibility of employees to vote. The Act specifies that
all agricultural employees whose names appear on the employer's
payroll immediately preceding the filing of the representation
107. ALRA § 1156.7(a).
108. ALRA § 1.5.
109. The language of the statute could also give rise to a contrary contention
that the pre-existing contract of an incumbent does not require the incumbent to
undergo any electoral test absent the filing of a decertification petition or petition
by a rival union and the incumbent can continue to act as bargaining representa-
tive under the contract until its expiration.
110. ALRA H§ 1156.3(c), 1157(a), 1159, 1153(f). For a discussion of
§ 1156.3 (c) and § 1153 (f), see text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
111. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App.
3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972); Castleman v. Scudder, 81 Cal. App. 2d 737,
185 P.2d 35 (1947); In re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934).
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petition shall be eligible to vote. 112  A provision similar to one in
the NLRA allows economic strikers to vote under specified condi-
tions. The statute also has special provisions relating to elections
conducted within 18 months of the effective date of the Act that
involve labor disputes commenced prior to that date; in such cases,
the board may adopt "fair, equitable, and appropriate eligibility
rules."
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REMEDIES, COURT REVIEW,
AND SUITS BETWEEN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND EMPLOYERS
The procedures established by the ALRA for handling
charges that the law has been violated are near-duplicates of
NLRA regulations, including provisions for hearings;.. 3 review by
the board;" 4 applications to the courts for appropriate injunctive
relief;" 5 specific remedies available to the board;" 6 review and
enforcement of board orders by the courts;117 and suits between
labor organizations and employers."' Two provisions which do
not have equivalents in the NLRA should be noted. One pertains
to a specific ALRA remedy,"' and the other to the procedure
by which board orders are reviewed and enforced. 20
The ALRA provides a specific "make whole" remedy to be
used "when the board deems such relief appropriate," in order
to compensate employees for losses sustained as a result of an em-
ployer's refusal to bargain with the employees' certified bargaining
representative.' 2' Under the NLRA, there have been instances
when employers have refused to bargain with a union, relying on
insubstantial or frivolous grounds, and have pursued the case
through the administrative and court systems. These tactics often
create a two or three year period in which the employer can avoid
bargaining with the union, since bargaining can be compelled only
after final court enforcement of the board's order.' 22 Meanwhile,
the employer has managed to delay for a two or three year period
any possible increase in wages or fringe benefits that might have
112. ALRA § 1157; see NLRA 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. 159(c)(3) (1970).
113. ALRA § 1160.2; see NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
114. ALRA § 1160.3; see NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
115. ALRA H9 1160.4, 1160.6; see NLRA H§ 10(j)-(I), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j)-
(1) (1970).
116. ALRA § 1160.3; see NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
117. ALRA § 1160.8; see NLRA §§ 10(e), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f)
(1970).
118. ALRA § 1165; see NLRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
119. ALRA § 1160.3.
120. ALRA § 1160.8.
121. ALRA § 1160.3.
122. See, e.g., United Steel Workers Union v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir.
1974).
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resulted from collective bargaining. There is no penalty attached
to this use of board and court procedures to avoid the bargaining
obligation, and if the legal expense involved in manufacturing the
delay is less than the increased costs of earlier bargaining, it is
to the employer's advantage to stall. Another advantage of this
tactic is that the union's strength may be dissipated during the
delay and its ability to bargain effectively impaired.
Naturally, the unions petitioned the NLRB for relief in these
situations, requesting that employees be "made whole" for losses
suffered by the refusal to bargain. Unions sought an order for-
cing employers to execute retroactively the contracts that they
would have entered into two or three years earlier if they had bar-
gained in good faith. The NLRB delayed taking a position on
this for a number of years; the difficulty in such a remedy is that
it requires determining what the collective agreement would have
been if the bargaining process had taken place at an earlier date.
The NLRB finally resolved the problem in a split decision by con-
cluding that Congress had not given the board the power to order
such a remedy. 1 2
3
Although the question of whether Congress granted this
power to the NLRB still is debated by some labor lawyers, there
is no doubt that the ALRA has given this potent remedy to the
ALRB. The grant of power, however, is tempered by the phrase
"when the board deems such relief appropriate." The board is
not likely to use this remedial power in every refusal to bargain
case, but the fact that it is available may cause employers to be
more cautious in refusing to bargain for insubstantial or frivolous
reasons.
The other significant change from the NLRA pertains to the
manner in which board orders are reviewed and enforced by the
courts. 1 24 Review of NLRB orders is obtained either by a peti-
tion for enforcement filed by the board, or a petition for review
filed by the aggrieved party. 125 In either event, the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals reviews the board's action and
determines whether the decision and order should be enforced.
If the employer or labor organization has not sought review in the
courts and has not voluntarily complied with the order, the board
is required to initiate a petition for enforcement, since NLRB
orders are not self-enforcing. Because of the numerous petitions
the board must file, there is a backlog of cases and the petitions
123. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Int'l Union,
UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Tidee Products, Inc.,
194 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1972).
124. ALRA § 1160.8.
125. NLRA H8 10(e), (f), 29 U.S.C. H8 160(e), (f) (1970).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
are not always filed immediately; this results in delays in the vin-
dication of the parties' rights under the Act. In other instances,
the aggrieved party decides to comply voluntarily only after the
petition or briefs have been filed with the court.
The ALRA seeks to speed the review process and eliminate
some wasted money and energy by placing the responsibility for
review of the board's order on the party affected by the order
rather than on the ALRB. Thus, the Act requires that the
aggrieved party initiate the review by filing a petition for review
with the appropriate court of appeal'26 within 30 days from the
issuance of the board's order. If no such petition is filed, the
board has a simplified method for enforcement of its orders.
Once the time for review has elapsed, the board may file a peti-
tion for enforcement with the appropriate superior court. In de-
ciding to enforce this order, the court is limited to consideration
of whether the order was issued according to established board
procedures. The statute specifically denies the superior court the
power to review the merits of the order. 127
Like ithe NLRA, the ALRA includes provisions permitting
suits for violation of contracts between employers and labor organ-
izations to be brought in any superior court having jurisdiction of
the parties.128
STATEMENT OF INTENT
A statement of intent published in the Senate Journal129
notes that the ALRA shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion
as guaranteed by article 1, section 4 of the California Constitu-
tion and the first amendment of the United States Constitution.
The only time the question of religious freedom appears to have
arisen with respect to the ALRA was during an attempt to
accommodate Seventh Day Adventists' religious objections to
membership in labor unions by providing a religious exemption
in the law.'30 Immediately prior to the passage of the law,
amendments were introduced to create the exemption, but since
all the parties directly affected by the new legislation had agreed
not to seek amendments once the final version of the bill had been
agreed upon, the religious exemption provision was rejected. It
126. Either a court of appeal having jurisdiction over the county where the al-leged unfair labor practice occurred or where the person resides or transacts busi-
ness.
127. ALRA § 1160.8.
128. ALRA § 1165; see NLRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
129. CAL. ST. S. JOUR. 16 (daily ed. May 26, 1975).
130. Cf. NLRA § 19, 29 U.S.C.A. § 169 (Supp. 1975) (religious exemptionprovided in new provisions for employees of health care institutions).
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is possible that this simple statement that the ALRA is not
intended to abridge religious rights might permit the board to
excuse a Seventh Day Adventist from union membership under
a union security agreement.
CONCLUSION
The new ALRA provides a viable legal framework for resolv-
ing California's farm labor problems. The law may not be
perfect in all respects, but it is a law which is intended to be fair
to all affected by it. As Governor Brown remarked when he
signed the legislation, however, it is "just a beginning."' 1
The preamble to the law states, "It is the hope of the Legis-
lature that farm laborers, farmers and all the people of California
will be served by the provisions of this act."'132 The fulfillment
of this hope and the success of the new legislation depend, of
course, on the cooperation, the efforts and the good faith of the
board and those whose activities are regulated by the law.
131. San Francisco Chronicle, June 6, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
132. ALRA § 1.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts from the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975
CHAPTER 3. RIGHTS OF AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES
1152. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of continued employment as authorized in subdivision (c) of
Section 1153.
CHAPTER 4. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND
REGULATION OF SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
1153. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an agricultural
employer to do any of the following:
(a) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce agricultural employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 1152.
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it. However, subject to such rules and regulations as may be made
and published by the board pursuant to Section 1144, an agricultural
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting agricultural employees
to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(c) By discrimination in regard to the hiring or tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment, -to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this part, or in any other statute of this state, shall
preclude an agricultural employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this section as an unfair labor practice) to require as
a condition of employment, membership therein on or after the fifth
day following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date
of such agreement whichever is later, if such labor organization is the
representative of the agricultural employees as provided in Section 1156
in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement.
No employee who has been required !to pay dues to a labor organiza-
tion by virtue of his employment as an agricultural worker during any
calendar month, shall be required to pay dues to another labor organi-
zation by virtue of similar employment during such month. For pur-
poses of this chapter, membership shall mean the satisfaction of all
reasonable terms and conditions uniformly applicable to other members
[Vol. 15
1975] AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 807
in good standing; provided, that such membership shall not be denied
or terminated except in compliance with a constitution or bylaws which
afford full and fair rights to speech, assembly, and equal voting and
membership privileges for all members, and which contain adequate
procedures to assure due process to members and applicants for
membership.
(d) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an agricul-
tural employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
this part.
(e) To refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with labor
organizations certified pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 (com-
mencing with Section 1156) of this part.
(f) To recognize, bargain with, or sign a collective-bargaining
agreement with any labor organization not certified pursuant to the pro-
visions of this part.
1154. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents to do any of the following:
(a) To restrain or coerce:
(1) Agricultural employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 1152. This paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisi-
tion or retention of membership therein.
(2) An agricultural employer in the selection of his representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances.
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an agricultural employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subdivision (c) of Section
1153, or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated for
reasons other than failure to satisfy the membership requirements spec-
ified in subdivision (c) of Section 1153.
(c) To refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with an agri-
cultural employer, provided it is the representative of his employees
subject to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1156)
of this part.
(d) To do either of -the following: (i) To engage in, or to induce
or encourage any individual employed by any person to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities, or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person; where in either case (i) or (ii)
an object thereof is any of the following:
(1) 'Forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person
to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agree-
ment which is prohibited by Section 1154.5.
(2) Forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
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processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bar-
gain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative
of such employees. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall be con-
strued to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing.
(3) Forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular labor organization as the representative of his agricul-
tural employees if another labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of Chapter 5(commencing with Section 1156) of this part.
(4) Forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work
to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade,
craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the board determining the bargaining represen-
tative for employees performing such work.
Nothing contained in this subdivision (d) shall be construed to
prohibit publicity, including picketing for the purpose of truthfully ad-
vising the public, including consumers, that a product or products oringredients thereof are produced by an agricultural employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed
by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect
of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the pri-
mary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up,
deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services at the
establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution, and as long
as such publicity does not have the effect of requesting the public to
cease patronizing such other employer.
However, publicity which includes picketing and has the effect of
requesting the public to cease patronizing such other employer, shall
be permitted only if the labor organization is currently certified as the
representative of the primary employer's employees.
Further, publicity other than picketing, but including peaceful dis-
tribution of literature which has the effect of requesting the public to
cease patronizing such other employer, shall be permitted only if the
labor organization has not lost an election for the primary employer's
employees within the preceding 12-month period, and no other labor
organization is currently certified as the representative of the primary
employer's employees.
Nothing contained in this subdivision (d) shall be construed to
prohibit publicity, including picketing, which may not be prohibited
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution.
Nor shall anything in this subdivision (d) be construed to apply
or be applicable to any labor organization in its representation of work-
ers who are not agricultural employees. Any such labor organization
shall continue to be governed in its intrastate activities for nonagricul-
tural workers by Section 923 and applicable judicial prededents.
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(e) To require of employees covered by an agreement author-
ized under subdivision (c) of Section 1153 the payment, as a condition
precedent to becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an
amount which the board finds excessive or discriminatory under all cir-
cumstances. In making such a finding, the board shall consider, among
other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations
in the agriculture industry and the wages currently paid to the employ-
ees affected.
(f) To cause or attempt to cause an agricultural employer to pay
or deliver, or agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value,
in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or
not to be performed.
(g) To picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or
cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is either
forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requir-
ing the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organ-
ization as -their collective-bargaining representative, -unless such labor
organization is currently certified as the representative of such employ-
ees, in any of the following cases:
(1) Where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance
with this part any other labor organization and a question concerning
representation may not appropriately be raised under Section 1156.3.
(2) Where within the preceding 12 months a valid election
under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1156) of this part has been
conducted.
Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to prohibit any
picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ mem-
bers of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect
of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver, or trans-
port any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this subdivision (g) shall be construed to permit any
act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section.
(h) To picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or
cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is either
forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with the labor
organization as a representative of his employees unless such labor or-
ganization is currently certified as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of such employees.
(i) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to make
unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
agricultural employer, other than his own employer, if the employees
of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a rep-
resentative of such employees whom such employer is required to
recognize under this part.
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1154.5. It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor
organization which represents the employees of the employer and such
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain,
from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore
or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be, to such extent,
unenforceable and void. Nothing in this section shall apply to an agree-
ment between a labor organization and an employer relating to a sup-
plier of an ingredient or ingredients which are integrated into a product
produced or distributed by such employer where the labor organization
is certified as the representative of the employees of such supplier, but
no collective-bargaining agreement between such supplier and such
labor organization is in effect. Further, nothing in this section shall
apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an agricultural
employer relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the farm and related operations. Nothing in this
part shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within
the foregoing exceptions.
Nor shall anything in this section be construed to apply or be ap-
plicable to any labor organization in its representation of workers who
are not agricultural employees. Any such labor organization shall con-
tinue to be governed in its intrastate activities for nonagricultural
workers by Section 923 and applicable judicial precedents.
1154.6. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or
labor organization, or their agents, willfully to arrange for persons to
become employees for the primary purpose of voting in elections.
1155. The expressing of any views, arguments, or opinions, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute evidence of an unfair labor practice under the
provisions of this part, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force, or promise of benefit.
1155.2. (a) For purposes of this part, to bargain collectively
in good faith is the performance of the mutual obligation of the agricul-
tural employer and the representative of the agricultural employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement, or any questions arising thereunder, and the execu-
tion of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if re-
quested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
(b) Upon the filing by any person of a petition not earlier than
the 90th day nor later than the 60th day preceding the expiration of
the 12-month period following initial certification, the board shall deter-
mine whether an employer has bargained in good faith with the cur-
rently certified labor organization. If the board finds that the employer
has not bargained in good faith, it may extend the certification for up
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to one additional year, effective immediately upon the expiration of the
previous 12-month period following initial certification.
1155.3. (a) Where there is in effect a collective-bargaining
contract covering agricultural employees, the duty to bargain collec-
tively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or
modification does all of the following:
(1) Serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract
of the proposed termination or modification not less than 60 days prior
to the expiration date thereof, or, in the event such contract contains
no expiration date, 60 days prior to the time it is proposed to make
such -termination or modification.
(2) Offers to meet and confer with the other party for the pur-
pose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed
modifications.
(3) Notifies the Conciliation Service of the State of California
within 30 days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, provided
no agreement has been reached by that time.
(4) Continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike
or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract, for a
period of 60 days after such notice is given, or until the expiration date
of such contract, whichever occurs later.
(b) The duties imposed upon agricultural employers and labor
organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subdivision (a) shall
become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the board that
the labor organization or individual which is a party to the contract
has been superseded as, or has ceased to be the representative of the
employees, subject to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with
Section 1156) of this part, and the duties so imposed shall not be con-
strued to require either party to discuss or agree to any modification
of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period,
if such modification is to become effective before such terms and condi-
tions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any agri-
cultural employee who engages in a strike within the 60-day period spe-
cified in this section shall lose his status as an agricultural employee
of the agricultural employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for
the purposes of Section 1153 to 1154 inclusive, and Chapters 5 (com-
mencing with Section 1156) and 6 (commencing with Section 1160) of
this part, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and
when he is reemployed by such employer.
1155.4. It shall be unlawful for any agricultural employer or
association of agricultural employers, or any person who acts as a labor
relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an agricultural employer, or
who acts in the interest of an agricultural employer, to pay, lend, or
deliver, any money or other thing of value to any of the following:
(a) Any representative of any of his agricultural employees.
(b) Any agricultural labor organization, or any officer or em-
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ployee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit
to membership, any of the agricultural employees of such employer.
(c) Any employee or group or committee of employees of such
employer in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of
causing such employee or group or committee directly or indirectly to
influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
(d) Any officer or employee of an agricultural labor organization
with intent to influence him in respect to any of his actions, decisions,
or duties as a representative of agricultural employees or as such officer
or employee of such labor organization.
1155.5. It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand,
receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan,
or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by Section
1155.4.
1155.6. Nothing in Section 1155.4 or 1155.5 shall apply to any
matter set forth in subsection (c) of Section 186 of Title 29 of the
United States Code.
1155.7. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or
be applicable to any labor organization in its representation of workers
who are not agricultural employees. Any such labor organization shall
continue to be governed in its intrastate activities for nonagricultural
workers by Section 923 and applicable judicial precedents.
CHAPTER 5. LABOR REPRESENTATIVES
AND ELECTIONS
1156. Representatives designated or selected by a secret ballot
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of -the agricul-
tural employees in the bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the agricultural employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment. Any individual agricul-
tural employee or a group of agricultural employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their agricultural employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargain-
ing representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect,
if the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.
1156.2. The bargaining unit shall be all the agricultural employ-
ees of an employer. If the agricultural employees of the employer are
employed in two or more noncontiguous geographical areas, the board
shall determine the appropriate unit or units of agricultural employees
in which a secret ballot election shall be conducted.
1156.3. (a) A petition which is either signed by, or accom-
panied by authorization cards signed by, a majority of the currently
employed employees in the bargaining unit may be filed in accordance
[Vol. 15
1975] AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 813
with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the board, by
an agricultural employee or group of agricultural employees, or any in-
dividual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging all the
following:
(1) That -the number of agricultural employees currently em-
ployed by the employer named in the petition, as determined from
his payroll immediately preceding the filing of the petition, is not less
than 50 percent of his peak agricultural employment for the current
calendar year.
(2) That no valid election pursuant to this section has been
conducted among the agricultural employees of the employer named in
the petition within the 12 months immediately preceding the filing
thereof.
(3) That no labor organization is currently certified as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the agricultural employees
of the employer named in the petition.
(4) That the petition is not barred by an existing collective-bar-
gaining agreement.
Upon receipt of such a signed petition, the board shall immediately
investigate such petition, and, if it has reasonable cause to believe that
a bona fide question of representation exists, it shall direct a representa-
tion election by secret ballot to be held, upon due notice to all interested
parties and within a maximum of seven days of the filing of the peti-
tion. If at the time the election petition is filed a majority of the em-
ployees in a bargaining unit are engaged in a strike, the board shall,
with all due diligence, attempt to hold a secret ballot election within
48 hours of the filing of such petition. The holding of elections under
strike circumstances shall take precedence over the holding of other
secret ballot elections.
The board shall make available at any election under this chapter
ballots printed in English and Spanish. The board may also make
available at such election ballots printed in any other language as may
be requested by an agricultural labor organization, or agricultural em-
ployee eligible to vote under this part. Every election ballot, except
ballots in runoff elections where the choice is between labor organiza-
tions, shall provide the employee with the opportunity to vote against
representation by a labor organization by providing an appropriate
space designated "No Labor Organizations".
(b) Any other labor organization shall be qualified to appear on
the ballot if it presents authorization cards signed by at least 20 percent
of the employees in the bargaining unit at least 24 hours prior to the
election.
(c) Within.five days after an election, any person may file with
the board a signed petition asserting that allegations made in the peti-
tion filed pursuant to subdivision (a) were incorrect, that the board im-
properly determined the geographical scope of the bargaining unit, or
objecting to the conduct of the election or conduct affecting the results
of the election.
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Upon receipt of a petition under this subdivision, the board, upon
due notice, shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the election
shall be certified. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or em-
ployee of a regional office of the board. He shall make no recommen-
dations with respect thereto. If the board finds, on the record of such
hearing, that any of the assertions made in the petition filed pursuant
to this subdivision are correct, or that the election was not conducted
properly, or misconduct affecting the results of the election occurred,
the board may refuse to certify the election. Unless the board deter-
mines that there are sufficient grounds to refuse to do so, it shall certify
the election.
(d) 'If no petition is filed pursuant to subdivision (c) within five
days of the election the board shall certify the election.
(e) The board shall decertify a labor organization if the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has found, pursuant
to Section 2000(e)(5) of Title 42 of the United States Code, that the
labor organization engaged in discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, sex or any other arbitrary or invidious classifi-
cation in violation of Subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of Title 42 of the
United States Code during the period of such labor organization's
present certification.
1156.4. Recognizing that agriculture is a seasonal occupation for
a majority of agricultural employees, and wishing to provide the fullest
scope for employees' enjoyment of the rights included in this part, the
board shall not consider a representation petition or a petition to decer-
tify as timely filed unless the employer's payroll reflects 50 percent of
the peak agricultural employment for such employer for the current
calendar year for the payroll period immediately preceding the filing of
the petition.
In this connection, the peak agricultural employment for the prior
season shall alone not be a basis for such determination, but rather the
board shall estimate peak employment on the basis of acreage and crop
statistics which shall be applied uniformly throughout the State of Cali-
fornia and upon all other relevant data.
1156.5. The board shall not direct an election in any bargaining
unit where a valid election has been held in the immediately preceding
12-month period.
1156.6. The board shall not direct an election in any bargaining
unit which is represented by a labor organization that has been certi-
fied within the immediately preceding 12-month period or whose certifi-
fication has been extended pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
1155.2.
1156.7. (a) No collective-bargaining agreement executed prior
to the effective date of this chapter shall bar a petition for an election.
(b) A collective-bargaining agreement executed by an employer
and a labor organization certified as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of his employees pursuant to this chapter shall be a 'bar to a
[Vol. 15
19751 AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 815
petition for an election among such employees for the term of the
agreement, but in any event such bar shall not exceed three years, pro-
vided that both ithe following conditions are met:
(1) The agreement is in writing and executed by all parties
thereto.
(2) It incorporates the substantive terms and conditions of
employment of such employees.
(c) Upon the filing with the board by an employee or group of
employees of a petition signed by 30 percent or more of the agricul-
tural employees in a bargaining unit represented by a certified labor
organization which is a party to a valid collective-bargaining agreement,
requesting that such labor organization be decertified, the board shall
conduct an election by secret 'ballot pursuant to the ,applicable provi-
sions of this chapter, and shall certify the results to such labor organiza-
tion and employer.
However, such a petition shall not be deemed timely unless it is
filed during the year preceding the expiration of a collective-bargaining
agreement which would otherwise bar the holding of an election, and
when the number of agricultural employees is not less than 50 percent
of the employer's peak agricultural employment for the current calendar
year.
(d) Upon the filing with the board of a signed petition by an
agricultural employee or group of agricultural employees, or any
individual or labor organization acting on their behalf, accompanied by
authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit, and alleging all the conditions of paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3), the board shall immediately investigate such petition and,
if it has reasonable cause to believe that a bona fide question of
representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot pursuant
to the applicable provisions of this chapter:
(1) That the number of agricultural employees currently em-
ployed by the employer named in the petition, as determined from his
payroll immediately preceding the filing of the petition, is not less than
50 percent of his peak agricultural employment for the current calendar
year.
(2) That no valid election pursuant to this section has been con-
ducted among the agricultural employees of the employer named in the
petition within .the 12 months immediately preceding the filing thereof.
(3) That a labor organization, certified for an appropriate unit,
has a collective-bargaining agreement with the employer which would
otherwise bar the holding of an election and that this agreement will
expire within the next 12 months.
1157. All agricultural employees of the employer whose names
appear on the payroll applicable to the payroll period immediately
preceding the filing of the petition of such an election shall be eligible
to vote. An economic striker shall be eligible to vote under such regu-
lations as the board shall find are consistent with the purposes and pro-
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visions of this part in any election, provided that the striker who has
been permanently replaced shall not be eligible to vote in any election
conducted more than 12 months after the commencement of the
strike.
In the case of elections conducted within 18 months of the effec-
tive date of this part which involve labor disputes which commenced
prior to such effective date, the board shall have the jurisdiction to
adopt fair, equitable, and appropriate eligibility rules, which shall
effectuate the policies of this part, with respect to the eligibility of eco-
nomic strikers who were paid for work performed or for paid vacation
during the payroll period immediately preceding the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement or the commencement of a strike; pro-
vided, however, that in no event shall the board afford eligibility to any
such striker who has not performed any services for the employer during
the 36-month period immediately preceding the effective date of this
part.
1157.2. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot
receives a majority, a runoff shall be conducted, the ballot providing
for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second
largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
1157.3. Employers shall maintain accurate and current payroll
lists containing the names and addresses of all their employees, and
shall make such lists available to the board upon request.
1158. Whenever an order of the board made pursuant to Section
1160.3 is based in whole or in part upon the facts certified following
an investigation pursuant to Sections 1156.3 to 1157.2 inclusive, and
there is a petition for review of such order, such certification and the
record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the
entire record required to be filed under Section 1160.8 and thereupon
the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or
in part the order of the board shall be made and entered upon the
pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
1159. In order to assure the full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of the employees own
choosing, only labor organizations certified pursuant to this part shall
be parties to a legally valid collective-bargaining agreement.
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